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The Dynamics of Inequality and Habitus Formation. 
Elias, Bourdieu, and the Rise of  
Nationalist Populism 
Nico Wilterdink ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Dynamiken von Ungleichheit und Herausbildung von Habitus. 
Elias, Bourdieu und der Aufstieg des nationalen Populismus«. This article deals 
with the dynamics of social inequality and social stratification from a histori-
cal-sociological perspective. It purports to clarify basic problems in this field 
with the help of insights developed by sociologists Norbert Elias and Pierre 
Bourdieu. I systematically compare both thinkers’ ideas on the dynamics of ine-
quality, pointing out similarities and divergences, and critically discuss them. 
After a summary of basic notions in their work, the paper deals subsequently 
with the reproduction of inequality in connection with habitus formation; 
changes in inequality structures over time - more specifically, trends of de-
creasing inequality (functional democratisation) and increasing inequality 
(functional de-democratisation); and the causal connections between changes 
in inequality structures and changes in habitus, mentality, and ideology. The 
final section of the paper focuses on a current issue: the emergence of popu-
lism in contemporary Western societies. On the basis of the preceding argu-
ment, I advance a tentative explanation of the rise of nationalist populism in 
the context of tendencies of increasing socioeconomic inequality. 
Keywords: Social inequality, power resources, social classes, habitus, populism. 
1.  Introduction 
In the 1980s, after a long period of decreasing class differences, socioeconomic 
inequality in the Western world took a turn toward a steady increase. Since that 
decade, differences in income and wealth have grown in most, if not all West-
ern countries. While top managerial incomes and private fortunes exploded, 
middle and lower level wages declined, stagnated, or rose only modestly. 
Moreover, material precariousness among the middle and lower strata in-
creased with declining job security, ‘flexibilisation’ of the labour market, heavy 
fluctuations in employment, and cuts in social insurance and welfare spending. 
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The power balance between big private firms, national governments and orga-
nized labour shifted in favour of the former. 
While this turn toward increasing inequality has evoked indignation and 
protest among certain groups, it has not led to broadly based class actions or to 
growing support for left-wing parties who traditionally claim to defend work-
ing-class interests. Rather the contrary: in recent years we have seen a turn to 
the right in many Western democracies, manifested by nationalist anti-
immigration parties who claim to represent ‘the people’ in opposition to a 
political and cultural (rather than economic) ‘elite’ which is perceived as fa-
vouring immigration and ethnic minorities. The intriguing question, then, is 
how to explain this rise of nationalist populism in view of the tendency towards 
growing socio-economic inequality? 
 This paper purports to clarify this issue. Before focusing on this current top-
ic, however, I will discuss a set of theoretical questions on a much higher level 
of generality within which the specific question on the emergence of nationalist 
populism can be placed: What is, in general terms, the connection between 
social stratification and class inequality on the one hand and differential habitus 
formation, mentality, and outlook on the other? How are inequality structures 
reproduced and how do they change? How do large-scale developments in 
social inequality and stratification impinge on changes in habitus among differ-
ent social strata? 
In dealing with these broad questions, I will draw from the work of the two 
social scientists who are, one may argue, the most important theorists on social 
inequality of the 20th century: Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu. Their theo-
retical views are similar, even to such a degree that some authors speak of one 
distinct sociological approach, called relational or processual (Paulle et al. 
2012; cf. Emirbayer 1997). Moreover, they share a focal interest in social ine-
quality. Both Elias and Bourdieu were preoccupied with questions concerning 
the nature, causes, and consequences of relations of unequal power, privileges, 
and prestige. Both regarded these questions as central to sociology, and had 
strong personal motivations, connected with their social background and life 
experiences, to focus their inquiries on these topics (Bourdieu 2007; Heinich 
2013). 
The first purpose of this paper is, then, to clarify general theoretical issues 
concerning the dynamics of social inequality with the help of the theories of 
Elias and Bourdieu. After a summary of basic notions in their work on social 
inequality (section 2), section 3 will deal with mechanisms of reproduction of 
inequality, and section 4 with mechanisms of change and development. Section 
5 will focus on the question of how changes in inequality structures and chang-
es in habitus formation are connected. On the basis of my theoretical argument, 
the final section will present a tentative explanation of the emergence of na-
tionalist populism in the context of growing socioeconomic inequality. 
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2.  ‘Beyond Marx’ 
In their work on social stratification and inequality, Elias and Bourdieu had to 
deal with the theory that still had an enormous impact on social thought and 
politics: Marxian class theory. Both claimed to go ‘beyond Marx’ by, on the 
one hand, recognizing the continuing importance of class relations as a source 
of tensions and conflicts in modern societies, and on the other hand, criticizing 
Marxian theory for its one-sidedness, determinism, and tendency to economic 
reductionism, and developing a much broader view on the sources and dynam-
ics of social inequality. 
Elias did so by arguing that social inequality, or, more specifically, social 
stratification was by no means defined exclusively by ‘classes’ in the Marxian 
sense. Social inequality could not simply be reduced to relations in the sphere 
of material production from which class divisions, such as between capital 
owning entrepreneurs and industrial workers, emerged. This was not even the 
case in Marx’s own time, during the heyday of expansive industrial capitalism 
(Elias 2006 [1970], 185-91). Therefore, Elias usually preferred the broader 
term ‘stratum’ (Schicht in German); this could refer to a primarily economic 
‘class,’ but also to, for example, a ruling group of warriors who base their 
power primarily on their control of the means of physical violence, or a court 
aristocracy whose members cultivate a distinct lifestyle, or an ethnic minority 
whose members are defined as outsiders by the dominating majority (see e.g. 
Elias 1997 [1939], 20-2, 79-80, 85-6, 301-4, 350-9, 368-70, 430-9). Relations 
of unequal power are at the root of all forms of stratification. This idea was 
originally formulated by Max Weber (1922, 631-40), who distinguished be-
tween ‘classes,’ ‘status groups’ (Stände), and ‘parties.’ Unlike Weber and later 
sociologists of stratification, however, Elias was wary of making sharp concep-
tual distinctions between different dimensions of social inequality or stratifica-
tion, as these dimensions are strongly intertwined; social strata observed in 
empirical reality, he suggested, are not merely ‘classes’ or ‘status groups’ or 
‘parties,’ but mixtures of such ideal types. 
Bourdieu went ‘beyond Marx’ in a different way. He held on to the centrali-
ty of ‘class’ and the Marxian assumption that class divisions are primarily 
based on differences in the possession of capital. He also concurred with the 
Marxian terminology by giving the three main class categories distinguished 
for contemporary French society the names of ‘bourgeoisie,’ ‘petite bourgeoi-
sie,’ and ‘working classes’ (Bourdieu 1984). He deviated from Marx, however, 
by redefining ‘capital’ into a much broader concept. In Bourdieu’s terminology 
the concept does not only refer to economic capital, but includes ‘cultural capi-
tal’ (everything profitable that is socially learned, ranging from school 
knowledge to social manners and cultural taste), ‘social capital’ (participation 
in valuable reciprocal social relations) and ‘symbolic capital’ (legitimate claims 
of status and authority), to take only the main types distinguished (Bourdieu 
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1986; 1987, 4; 1991, esp. 238-9). Moreover, modern societies are differentiated 
into ‘fields,’ which differ in prioritizing different forms of capital. Thus, while 
the accumulation of economic capital is the primary goal in the business world, 
which is the core of the economic field, the acquisition and accumulation of 
cultural capital has priority in the fields of education, the sciences, and the arts 
(Bourdieu 1993). At the same time, the fields are interwoven and interconnect-
ed, and the different types of capital are convertible into one another. Each type 
is pursued as both an end in itself and a means to accumulate more capital of 
the same or other types. 
While the terminology differs, the theoretical views on social inequality de-
veloped by Elias and Bourdieu are similar. Bourdieu’s concept of ‘capital’ can 
be regarded as identical to ‘power resource’ as used by Elias. Both Elias and 
Bourdieu argue that different power resources or types of capital are intercon-
nected but cannot be reduced to one another, and that they generate various 
forms of social inequality, which vary among societies and change over time. 
Power resources are often at the same time intrinsically rewarding privileges, 
and privileges often function as power resources or forms of capital. Elias and 
Bourdieu both reject simple cause-and-effect models in which causation is 
supposed to work in one direction, and argue, instead, for thinking in terms of 
processes of mutual causation. 
There are also strong similarities in the types of power resources or capital 
that our two protagonists put forward. Thus, Elias (1994, xviii) argued in The 
Established and the Outsiders that social cohesion is an important power re-
source, to be distinguished from capital ownership and control of the means of 
physical violence; this is akin to Bourdieu’s notion of social capital. Elias also 
introduced in this book the concept of ‘group charisma,’ which is similar to 
Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic capital.’ 
There are also striking differences, however. Bourdieu did not include the 
control of means of violence in his list of capital types, though he dealt exten-
sively with state power in a posthumously published volume (Bourdieu 2012). 
Elias, on his part, did not mention explicitly school knowledge and formal 
education as a power resource, which in Bourdieu’s terminology is dubbed 
‘educational capital’ (capital scolaire), an important part of cultural capital. 
These conceptual divergences have to do with differences in empirical orienta-
tion and research interests: whereas Elias investigated long-term social devel-
opments in which violent struggles for political power were essential, Bourdieu 
focused most of his empirical research on one contemporary, relatively pacified 
state society, France, in which formal education has become a main determi-
nant of occupation and income chances. As both scholars developed their theo-
retical ideas in immediate connection to their empirical work, this partly ex-
plains the theoretical and conceptual differences. 
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3.  Habitus and the Reproduction of Inequality 
The arguably most important similarity between the two thinkers has not yet 
been mentioned: their focus on the mental, psychological consequences of 
social inequality. They both explained and demonstrated how people’s person-
alities are shaped by their position in inequality structures, how inequality goes 
under their skin, forming their attitudes, outlook, and habits; in short, how it 
moulds their habitus. This is central in almost all of Elias’s work, from On the 
Process of Civilization and The Court Society to Studies on the Germans. It is 
just as important in Bourdieu’s oeuvre, exemplified most famously by Distinc-
tion (1984). 
Again, habitus is not just an ‘effect,’ but also a ‘cause’: maintaining and re-
inforcing the inequality by which it is shaped. Differential habitus formation is 
essential to the reproduction of social inequality. Elias made this most explicit 
in The Established and the Outsiders, in which he and his student John Scotson 
describe the results of their research into the relations between two groups of 
inhabitants of a working-class neighbourhood in Northern England in the 1950s 
(Elias and Scotson 1994). The one group consisted of ‘old families’ who lived 
there for generations, the other group were newcomers. The first group, the 
‘established,’ was characterized by strong mutual bonds among its members, a 
strong internal social control with which relatively strict norms were upheld, 
feelings of group pride (‘group charisma’) and corresponding negative feelings 
about the members of the other group, the ‘outsiders,’ who were stigmatized as 
inferior, indecent, uncivilized. On the basis of this ‘empirical paradigm,’ Elias 
developed a general model of established-outsider relations. Whenever there is 
a clear power difference between two interrelated groups, the more powerful 
group will develop feelings of superiority with respect to the less powerful 
group, attribute negative traits to the members of this other group and avoid 
friendly, informal contacts with them. The less powerful on their part cannot 
avoid being negatively stigmatized; when the power differences are large and 
durable, they tend to accept and internalize the negative stigma, developing 
feelings of inferiority. It is in this way that the inequality between the two 
groups is continued and confirmed. Feelings of superiority among the estab-
lished are not only the consequence of unequal power relations; they become in 
turn a power resource that helps to maintain these relations. 
Based on quite different empirical investigations, Bourdieu elaborated simi-
lar ideas about the mechanisms of reproduction of social inequality (Bourdieu 
and Passeron 1977; Bourdieu 1984). People with different class positions de-
velop different orientations, manners, habits, preferences, and norms by which 
they judge other people’s behaviour. Some preferences and judgements are 
legitimate; that is, they have more ‘authority’ than others, depending on the 
capital or power position of those who express these preferences and judge-
ments. Cultural differences are not neutral; they are differences in cultural 
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capital in so far as they bring forward differential social advantages and disad-
vantages. This is most apparent in the educational system. Schools transmit a 
culture that is familiar to the dominant class, and school achievements are 
judged accordingly, so that children from this class have the best chances to 
achieve well at school and to acquire the educational credentials that give them 
access to well-paid and prestigious occupations. In this way, the educational 
system serves as an institution of reproduction of class inequality, despite its 
formal openness and principles of ‘meritocratic’ selection, which serve as a 
legitimation of the system by concealing the reproduction mechanism. Besides, 
even when young people with different social origins have equal educational 
credentials, those from ‘good’ families have better occupational chances since 
their habitus is more adapted to the preferences and requirements of those who 
decide about their careers, who usually share the same class habitus. All forms 
of capital distinguished by Bourdieu – economic, cultural, social, symbolic – 
are to a large extent transmitted from one to the next generation along family 
lines (though often indirectly and covertly) and, therefore, are vehicles of re-
production of inequality. The dominant institutions of society – the state, the 
law, the school system – all contribute to the legitimation of class inequality 
and its reproduction; they exert, in Bourdieu’s strong words, ‘symbolic vio-
lence’ (1977, 190-7) toward the underprivileged who, as a result, tend to accept 
their position as normal and become complicit in producing and reproducing 
inequality. 
All this sounds perhaps quite different from Elias’s treatise on the estab-
lished and the outsiders. Yet the basic argument is the same. The effective 
negative stigmatisation of the outsiders by the established is what Bourdieu 
would call symbolic violence. The ‘group charisma’ of the established is ‘sym-
bolic capital’ in Bourdieu’s terms. Power differences are translated into mental, 
‘habitual’ differences, which express, legitimate, reinforce and serve to contin-
ue the power differences: this is the basic mechanism of reproduction that both 
authors point out. 
A few critical remarks are in place here. Bourdieu’s concept of ‘reproduc-
tion’ implicitly refers to two processes of continuation, which are not clearly 
distinguished: the continuation of current inequality structures, and the inter-
generational transfer of capital and privileges along family lines. Reproduction 
in both senses is never perfect: inequality structures always change to some 
extent, and there is always some degree of intergenerational mobility – the 
transfer of capital (particularly cultural or, more specifically, educational capi-
tal) from parents to children is never guaranteed. The question then is, how 
strong is the degree of ‘reproduction’ in these two senses in different societies 
and time periods? Another question is how these two forms of variable repro-
duction are empirically interconnected – in particular, how individual or collec-
tive social mobility (i.e. ‘imperfect’ reproduction in the second sense) may 
induce changes in inequality structures and differential habitus formation, 
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  28 
which signify ruptures in the reproduction of structures of inequality; and vice 
versa. Bourdieu did not deal explicitly with these questions. 
Another limitation in the work of both Elias and Bourdieu is that in stressing 
the adaptive and reproductive functions of habitus, they did not discuss system-
atically and extensively the possibility that the habitus contains potentialities 
for resistance, opposition or even revolt, and the conditions under which these 
potentialities may manifest in actual behaviour (cf. Crossley 2003). I will re-
turn to this point in section 5. 
4. Trends and Transformations in Social Inequality:  
Functional Democratisation and De-Democratisation 
The theories of Elias and Bourdieu diverge more widely when it comes to 
trends and transformations in social inequality. While both approaches are 
dynamic, Bourdieu does not seem to be very much concerned with the structure 
of social developments in the long run. He does describe and analyse certain 
historical developments, such as the genesis of the literary field in nineteenth-
century France (Bourdieu 1996), and the growing importance and strong ex-
pansion of formal education in the twentieth century, with its momentous con-
sequences for class relations, social reproduction, and habitus formation. But 
these changes are not explained from a developmental perspective, which is 
central in Elias’s approach.1 In particular, Bourdieu does not enter into ques-
tions about the direction of trends in social inequality – whether societies be-
come more or less unequal in given periods, and how to explain these trends. 
These questions have been discussed by Elias in several of his writings. In 
his opus magnum on the process of civilisation, he refers to ‘increasing con-
straints on the upper class’ and ‘increasing pressures from below’ as part of the 
social transformations that were at the basis of civilising processes in Europe 
since the late Middle Ages (Elias 2012 [1939), 464-78). In line with this, he 
introduces in Was ist Soziologie? (1970) the concept of ‘functional democrati-
sation’ to refer to a trend of diminishing power differences in European socie-
ties during the last two to three hundred years: a ‘reduction of power differen-
tials between governments and governed,’ a ‘reduction of power differentials 
between different strata,’ and a ‘transformation of all social relationships in the 
direction of a greater degree of reciprocal, multi-polar dependence and control.’ 
Functional democratisation has been the basis of institutional democratisation, 
which includes the shift from monarchical to parliamentary power and the 
                                                             
1  This is not to say that Bourdieu was only a theorist of reproduction or that his work is  
a-historical (see for extensive criticisms of such an interpretation: Gorski 2013). Yet he dis-
trusted general statements on long-term developments (see e.g. Bourdieu and Chartier 
2015, 58-66; cf. also Calhoun 1993, and Calhoun 2013, esp. 65, note 6). 
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extension of voting rights to, eventually, all adult citizens of a nation-state 
(Elias 2012 [1970], 61-3).  
Elias explains this development as resulting from processes of functional 
specialisation and differentiation, in which members of different occupational 
groups and strata become more mutually and reciprocally dependent on each 
other, and, related to that, the extension of networks of interdependence. 
“Chains of interdependence become more differentiated and grow longer; 
consequently they become more opaque and, for any single group or individu-
al, more uncontrollable” (ibid., 64). As a consequence of these intertwined 
processes, power balances tend to become more even. 
This explanation seems to rest on two general assumptions. The first is that 
power differentials are a function of relations of interdependence: the less one-
sided and more mutually reciprocal the interdependencies between groups and 
individuals in a given social figuration are, the narrower the power differences. 
Secondly, it is assumed that functional differentiation and the lengthening of 
the chains of interdependence imply a movement in the direction of more mu-
tuality, more reciprocity in the relations of interdependence and, therefore, 
more even power balances. While the first assumption is well-grounded (cf. 
Emerson 1962; Blau 1967), the second is much more vulnerable to empirical 
criticism. 
If we broaden the scope to places and periods other than Europe following 
the Middle Ages or the start of the industrial revolution, it is not difficult to 
find historical developments that contradict this second thesis. Since the emer-
gence of agriculture in some parts of the world, functional differentiation and 
the growth of networks of interdependence went hand in hand with the growth 
of power differentials within and between human societies – increasing stratifi-
cation, growing distance between elites and common people, sharper differen-
tiation between rulers and ruled. For the greater part of human history, we can 
see a positive causal connection between social differentiation and the growth 
of networks of interdependence on the one hand, and increasing power differ-
ences and social inequality on the other. When societies grew larger and more 
differentiated, some people could profitably specialize in activities other than 
the production of goods – in the use of physical force to exploit other people 
(warriors), in religious knowledge and rituals (priests), or in long-distance trade 
(merchants), and thereby accumulate power and wealth (Lenski 1966; Mann 
1986; Goudsblom 1996a, 1996b; Scheidel 2017). 
If there is a connection between functional differentiation and growing net-
works of interdependence on the one hand and decreasing inequality of power 
and privileges on the other, it is apparently valid for only specific historical 
periods under specific conditions. An important condition in Europe since the 
nineteenth century is that these processes largely took place in the framework 
of strong and strengthening national states that heavily competed with one 
another. Within national state boundaries, owners and managers of industrial 
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firms became more dependent on industrial workers as the demand for indus-
trial work increased, and national governments became more dependent on 
citizens of all strata of the population, as they were increasingly mobilized for 
common national goals, particularly in times of war and war preparation. The 
growth of government expenditures and government control (in the spheres of 
education, health, infrastructure, social security as well as the police and the 
army) went hand in hand with the extension of citizens’ rights, including voting 
rights. These changes in the nature of interdependencies on the national level, 
together with long-term intensive economic growth since the beginnings of 
large-scale industrial production, led to substantial improvements in the living 
conditions of workers, which helped them to pursue their collective interests. 
Literacy, more leisure time, higher wages, better health: these were power 
resources conducive to the organization of workers in unions and political 
parties, which were in turn power resources that could contribute to further 
improvements in their living conditions and to an overall decrease in socioeco-
nomic inequality. 
When Elias published Was ist Soziologie? in 1970, this development within 
Western national state societies was about to reach its culmination point. Un-
precedented post-war economic growth had made possible the extension of 
inclusive welfare arrangements in increasingly prosperous societies in which 
poverty had virtually disappeared and income and wealth differences had be-
come smaller than ever before. Around 1970, there were hardly any signs that 
this development would stop in the foreseeable future. Like Elias, most social 
scientists viewed democratisation and the diminishment of inequalities as a 
consequence and integral part of ongoing modernisation. 
This is not what happened after the 1970s. As noted in the first paragraph, 
social inequality has tended to increase since around 1980, at least in the eco-
nomic sphere (OECD 2011; Atkinson et al. 2011; Piketty 2014; Reich 2007). 
We may explain this recent trend with the help of a figurational or ‘Eliasian’ 
power-interdependence model, which assumes that (1) inequalities in material 
and nonmaterial privileges or rewards are a function of power differentials, (2) 
power differentials are a function of relations of interdependence (as noted 
above), and (3) interdependencies at different integration levels (such as state 
and inter-state levels) are interconnected (Wilterdink 2000, 2016). The basic 
explanation is that with strong and ongoing economic internationalisation and 
globalisation over the past few decades, interdependencies on the national level 
have become weaker; in particular, economically privileged and powerful 
groups and organisations have become less dependent on other groups and 
organisations within national state borders, including national governments. 
Globalisation processes since the 1970s, induced by technological innovations 
in communication and transport, as well as political reforms directed at ‘liberal-
izing’ international markets, are a continuation of the long-term trend of the 
extension of networks of interdependence, but now leading to a weakening of 
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interdependencies on the national scale. With the enormous increase of interna-
tional capital mobility and the growth and transnationalisation of large private 
companies and investment funds, the owners and managers of these organisa-
tions become less dependent on the workers and the government of a given 
national state. Unions lose bargaining power when their (potential) members 
have to compete with workers in other states on an international labour market. 
Governments become more dependent on international capital flows and trans-
national corporations as they have to compete for investments and jobs, and are 
under increasing pressure to make their country more attractive for these ‘glob-
al players’ by lowering taxes and labour costs and deregulating the economy. 
The trend of growing inequalities is not confined to the economic sphere, 
but has political repercussions as well. Particularly for the United States, in 
which economic inequality has increased more than in any other Western coun-
try since the 1980s, an interaction between this trend and a growing impact on 
American politics by business organisations, corporations, financial institu-
tions, and wealthy individuals – through intensive lobbying, financing election 
campaigns, think tanks, and mass media – has been observed (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010; Volscho and Kelly 2012; Stiglitz 2012). Such a spiral of mutual 
causation between increasing economic inequality and increasing political 
inequality can be observed, or presumed, for other Western state societies as 
well (Crouch 2004). There are reasons, then, to contend that the trend of func-
tional democratisation within industrial nation-states did not only come to a 
halt since the 1980s, but reversed in the direction of what some authors have 
called functional de-democratisation (Mennell 2007, 311, 313; Mennell 2014; 
Alikhani 2014). 
The picture is different when we look at socioeconomic inequalities on a 
global scale. The historical period in which the trend of functional democratisa-
tion within Western national societies was dominant also saw a strong increase 
of global inequality. In the second half of the nineteenth century, when in the 
West, mass parties and labour unions were founded which gave a voice to 
lower strata, Western states extended and intensified their colonial power over 
large parts of the rest of the world. This was reversed after the Second World 
War when former colonies acquired political independence, but in this same 
period the income gap between the rich, mainly Western countries and poor, 
non-Western countries further increased dramatically. 
This also changed since the 1980s. All in all, the gap between rich and poor 
countries began to diminish, though the economic growth rates among different 
poorer regions and countries varied strongly. The most striking component of 
this trend was the spectacular economic expansion since the late 1970s of the 
world’s most populous country, China, which rose from a position among the 
poorest countries to a middle-income level. To put it schematically: increasing 
economic inequality within countries (in Western, but also most non-Western 
countries) is accompanied with a tendency of decreasing economic inequality 
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between countries (Milanovic 2016). Both tendencies can be plausibly related 
to globalisation: the extension of interdependencies at transnational and global 
levels. The relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing industries and the 
growth of investment flows from richer to poorer countries weakened the posi-
tion of workers in the rich countries, and contributed to economic growth in 
poorer regions and thereby narrowing the gap with richer countries. We have to 
keep in mind, however, that not all poor countries and regions in the world 
conform to this general pattern, and specific local conditions continue to play a 
significant role in the chances for economic growth. 
5.  Changes in Social Inequality and Habitus Formation 
Developments in power relations towards decreasing or increasing inequality 
on different levels as sketched in the preceding section will have consequences 
for habitus formation among the groups involved. What are these consequences? 
Following Elias and Bourdieu, the most general answer to this general question 
is that members of different groups will adapt their habitus to the changing 
situation. When members of a powerful group lose power, their feelings of 
superiority with respect to the less powerful will become more unstable, weaker, 
and eventually perhaps vanish altogether. And when a relatively powerless 
group wins power, their feelings of inferiority, their internalized negative self-
stigmatisation, will become weaker and possibly disappear. Members of a 
collectively rising group may even develop feelings of superiority with respect 
to a more powerful group, Elias argued, as they resort to ‘counter-
stigmatisation,’ attributing negative traits to the still dominant but challenged 
group (Elias 2012 [1939], 472-3; 1994, xxi). 
These ideas can be used to explain observable changes in habitus and cul-
tural orientations in relation to the trend of decreasing power disparities within 
Western nation-states from about 1880 to 1980. In everyday social interactions 
between members of different strata, status inequality became less outspoken; 
as can be derived from etiquette books, it became more or less taboo for mem-
bers of dominant groups to explicitly express status superiority over people 
from lower ranks, whereas for the latter the social coercion to show inferiority, 
deference, and obedience toward people with a higher status weakened 
(Wouters 2007; Elias 2013 [1989], 22-48; cf. Collins 2004, 258-96). Egalitari-
an ideas spread and became stronger among various groupings of the popula-
tion, including the upper and middle strata. Functional and institutional democ-
ratisation went hand in hand with ‘habitual’ democratisation (Alikhani 2014). 
However, as the decrease of inequality took place within the framework of 
competing national states, these egalitarian ideas and attitudes were often con-
fined to the national borders and coupled with strong national we-feelings, 
antagonistic feelings toward other nations and the negative stigmatisation of 
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minorities within the state borders who were defined as not belonging to the 
nation. The wave of democratisation at the end of the nineteenth century went 
together with an upsurge of ethnic nationalism, which could stand in the way of 
institutional democratisation. This was manifested most dramatically in the rise 
of Fascism – including National Socialism – in Central Europe after the First 
World War. With its stress on mass mobilization, national solidarity, and a 
strong caring state, Fascism had undeniably egalitarian traits, while at the same 
time it was anti-democratic in its rejection of plurality, its reverence for author-
itarian leadership, and its definition of other nations or races within and outside 
the state borders as both dangerous and inferior. It was only after the Second 
World War, and as a response to that war, that the idea of universal human 
rights became internationally recognized, formalised, and institutionalised. 
National we-feelings remained important, however, and continued to mix or to 
compete with other group identifications. 
The intensification of class struggles and the rise of socialism in the nine-
teenth century may also be interpreted with the help of Elias’s argument. 
Growing class conflicts, he suggests, did not spring from the growing (absolute 
or at least relative) misery of the working class and a widening gap with the 
bourgeoisie, as Marx would have it, but rather from an increase in relative 
power of the working class in relation to the dominant strata. Socialism was, 
for members of the working class and their intellectual leaders, a way of coun-
ter-stigmatising the bourgeoisie and expressing one’s own moral superiority, or 
even (as in the Marxist doctrine) one’s superior knowledge about the course of 
history. 
Yet it would be too simple to turn the Marxian thesis on its head and leave it 
at that. In order to understand in general terms ‘why men rebel,’ we may start 
with the assumption that the habitus is usually not a coherent whole, but con-
tains diverging dispositions. More specifically, we may assume that in a strati-
fied society the habitus of the underprivileged and dominated is a mixture of 
acceptance and rejection of existing inequalities; of deference and conformity 
toward the more powerful on the one hand, feelings of resentment and animosi-
ty on the other (Wertheim 1974, 105-19).2 Negative feelings and oppositional 
dispositions among the dominated become more manifest and stronger, one 
may hypothesize, under three conditions: 1) the power balance changes in 
favour of the dominated;3 2) conflicts of interests between the dominant and the 
                                                             
2  In some parts of their work, both Elias and Bourdieu allude to this basic ambivalence (e.g. 
Elias 2012 [1939], 472ff; Bourdieu 1991, 90-102).  
3  This has been advanced not only by Elias, but also suggested in the extensive literature on 
social movements and social revolutions with such notions as ‘power resource mobilization’ 
and ‘political opportunity structure’ (see e.g. Snow et al. 2004). Cf. also Elias (2006 [1969], 
286-93) on ‘the sociogenesis of the French revolution’ in the final chapter of The Court So-
ciety.  
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dominated become more visible and outspoken;4 and 3) the living conditions 
and prospects of the dominated worsen in relation to habitus-induced social 
expectations.5 
For the working classes of the industrializing societies in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the first and second conditions were met according to 
several indications. The relative power of the industrial working class increased 
with growing interdependence between social classes within nation-states and 
processes of large-scale industrialisation and urbanisation, which created fa-
vourable conditions for workers to organise into unions and parties to defend 
their interests.6 The power shift in favour of the industrial working class mani-
fested in political measures, such as the legal recognition of labour unions, the 
regulation of working hours, and the extension of the franchise. In this same 
period, conflicts of interest between social classes became more visible, as the 
contrasts between the rich and the poor could be identified increasingly with 
conflicts in the field of material production between exploiting capitalist own-
ers and exploited workers, whose labour produced the capitalists’ profits. This 
definition of the situation was a powerful motivation of class action. 
As a result of decreasing power differences in combination with long-term 
economic growth, the economic position of the working class improved con-
siderably in the course of the twentieth century, both in absolute terms and in 
comparison to other classes. This became particularly clear in the first three 
                                                             
4  I have advanced and elaborated this idea in my work on the development of property 
relations and wealth inequality in the Netherlands since the mid-nineteenth century 
(Wilterdink 2015, 261-7). 
5  This is a core idea in older explanations of social revolutions and rebellions, such as by 
Davies (1969) and Gurr (1970). While this much-criticized ‘volcanic model’ (Aya 1990) pro-
vides, at best, only partial explanations for actual actions of rebellion and resistance, the 
core idea itself remains quite plausible. It has been used by Bourdieu (1988, 156 ff.) in his 
analysis of the student revolt in Paris in May 1968; a basic source of this revolt, according 
to him, was the growing discrepancy between normative expectations about the value of 
academic diplomas and their actual devaluation. Another, broader elaboration of this idea is 
by Barrington Moore (1978), who suggests that feelings of injustice arise when the ‘moral 
code’ of perceived reciprocity between rulers and ruled is broken. All three hypothesized 
conditions deserve, of course, a much longer discussion than can be given in the framework 
of this paper. 
6  These processes contributing to increasing working class power are part of the Marxian 
account of intensifying class struggles under capitalism (Marx and Engels 1976 [1848], 490-
4). Even the notion of growing interdependence between bourgeoisie and working class is 
not absent: “The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. […] In all these battles 
it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it 
into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its 
own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat 
with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie” (ibid., 493). These ideas were not conceived, 
however, in terms of changing power relations. Marxian theory combines an implicit notion 
of growing power resources for the working class in the course of capitalist development 
with an explicit stress on the growing gap with the bourgeoisie. 
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decades after the Second World War, when fast income growth and the exten-
sion of welfare state arrangements led to unprecedented levels of consumption 
and material security. In this development, parties that claimed to represent 
workers’ interests became, on the whole, more moderate and pragmatic, substi-
tuting ideas of a ‘mixed economy,’ regulated industrial relations, and gradual 
progress for the prospect of intensifying class struggles leading to an overthrow 
of capitalism. This ideological change was viewed by some sociologists in the 
1950s and 1960s as indicative of the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the working class: 
with growing prosperity, its members would increasingly resemble, or even 
join, the middle classes. Yet, as critics of this thesis pointed out, oppositional 
dispositions among industrial workers, though hardly radical, did not disappear 
in this period, and working-class families in Western Europe still tended to 
remain distinct from white collar middle-class families in work orientation, 
lifestyle, class identification, and political attitudes (Goldthorpe et al. 1969). 
This changed in the decades that followed, when manifest class divisions 
tended to fade away. With the transformation of inequality structures, group 
identifications changed. Group boundaries were redefined, feelings of solidari-
ty and animosity redirected. This will be specified in the next section, where 
we deal with the recent rise of nationalist populism. 
6. Growing Socioeconomic Inequality and the Rise of  
Nationalist Populism 
How can the rise of nationalist populism in contemporary Western societies in 
the context of increasing socioeconomic inequality be explained, then? I will 
suggest here a tentative and succinct answer on the basis of the preceding theo-
retical argument. 
The concept of ‘nationalist populism’ (or, for short, just ‘populism’) is used 
here to refer to the political ideas propagated by such parties as the Front Na-
tional in France, the AfD in Germany, the FPÖ in Austria, the UKIP in Britain, 
the PVV in the Netherlands, the Lega Nord in Italy as well as the branch of the 
Republican Party embodied by the new president of the United States. Popu-
lism in these different manifestations claims to represent the will of ‘the peo-
ple’ or ‘the nation’ in opposition to a political and cultural ‘elite’ that sets itself 
apart from the large majority, serves its own interests to the detriment of the 
common good, and favours outsider groups of foreigners, immigrants, and 
ethnic and racial minorities. Populist leaders claim to voice the opinions of the 
people, defined as united and indivisible; therefore, their opponents can only be 
enemies of the people. In its stress on national unity and homogeneity, popu-
lism is anti-liberal and anti-pluralistic (cf. Mudde 2007; Müller 2016). 
Two kinds of social scientific explanations for the growing attraction of 
populism in recent years have been advanced: a cultural explanation, which 
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views populism’s popularity as a backlash, a reaction against large cultural 
transformations in Western societies during the past few decades in the direc-
tion of secularization, individualism, permissiveness, cosmopolitanism, and 
gender equality; and an economic or materialistic explanation, which views the 
movement primarily as a response to increasing relative deprivation and eco-
nomic insecurity (Inglehart and Norris 2016). While both explanations find a 
degree of support in empirical research, they are, at best, only partial, even if 
combined. The cultural thesis cannot explain why populist movements of the 
kind and the size that we see today in Western societies, did not arise already in 
the 1960s and subsequent decades, when the cultural transformations that 
populism is supposed to be a reaction against were particularly strong. Moreover, 
not all populist parties distinguish themselves by an outspoken and comprehen-
sive cultural conservatism. While the Christian Right, with its stress on family 
values and strict sexual morality, is a feeding ground and supporter of right-
wing populism in the United States, this is not, or much less, the case in West-
ern Europe. Thus, the Dutch populist leader Geert Wilders (PVV) stresses the 
national values of gender equality and sexual freedom against Islamic intoler-
ance, traditionalism, and oppression of women (cf. Brubaker 2017). 
The economic explanation falls short as it does not make clear why material 
deprivation, economic insecurity, and increasing inequality would give rise to 
nationalist populism, and why these tendencies did not lead to more support 
for, and radicalisation of, established socialist or social-democratic parties (but 
rather to the contrary), to a renewed intensification of class conflicts, and to 
mass protests against the growing power and wealth of the corporate rich. True, 
in recent years there have been, in various countries, waves of radical, anti-
capitalist opposition to growing inequality (such as the Occupy movement that 
started in New York in 2011), but these movements were mainly articulated 
and supported by intellectuals and high-educated young people with uncertain 
career prospects. Among the supporters of anti-immigration populist parties 
and politicians, on the other hand, people with lower educational qualifications 
and in economically vulnerable positions (manual workers, low-paid service 
workers, small entrepreneurs) are overrepresented (Inglehart and Norris 2016). 
In the broader explanation that I propose here, the recent rise of nationalist 
populism in Western societies is viewed as a manifestation of habitus changes 
that are related to transformations in the class structure: processes in which the 
growth of class inequalities combines with the blurring of class boundaries and 
the weakening of class identities. With the shrinking of the industrial working 
class since the 1970s, the decline of labour unions (in membership and bargain-
ing power), the shift toward a postindustrial service economy and the increas-
ing flexibilisation of work relations, ‘class’ has largely lost its significance as a 
basis of group identification and political outlook. Instead, and connected with 
these economic changes, an ethos of meritocratic individualism, which legiti-
mates economic inequality as the result of fair competition on the basis of 
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individual achievements and merits, has become more dominant. In this ideol-
ogy, high incomes and large private fortunes reflect outstanding achievements 
by successful individuals rather than unjust social arrangements. With the 
power shift in favour of the owners and managers of transnational firms, these 
members of the economic elite enlarged not only their economic capital, but 
also their symbolic capital; popular media gave them increasing publicity as 
models of success to be followed; and the inclination to upwards identification 
with this economic elite among the less well-to-do grew stronger.  
Changes in power-interdependence relations on national and international 
levels also had an impact on the ideological orientations of politicians and 
political parties. Neo-liberalism, as it came to be called, with its core idea that 
government regulation of the economy should be kept to a minimum and that 
free markets serve the general interest, became the dominant creed. This ex-
tended to parties that traditionally claimed to serve the interests of the under-
privileged, such as Britain’s Labour Party, the Social Democratic parties on the 
European continent and the Democratic Party in the USA, which accepted and 
instigated policies of privatization, deregulation, lower tax rates on profits and 
high incomes, and cuts in social expenditures (cf. Bourdieu 1999, 2001). What-
ever one may think of this reorientation, its effect was that these parties could 
hardly function anymore as objects of identification for members of lower and 
middle strata, or canalize and articulate their grievances. Progressive parties 
came to align with ‘identity movements’ of women, gays, and ethnic and racial 
minorities, which had a strong base at universities and attracted high-educated 
people in particular. This only contributed to the growing distance between 
these parties and non-minority members of lower strata. Terms like leftist, 
progressive and (in the American discourse) liberal came to be associated in-
creasingly with high-educated, intellectual, and elitist. 
At the same time, non-minority members of middle and lower classes in 
Western societies – comprising manual workers, small entrepreneurs, and 
service workers with low or intermediate educational qualifications – experi-
enced material deprivations and status degradation, which fuelled grievances 
and resentment. They underwent, we may say, a fourfold relative loss. First, as 
citizens of rich nation-states they lost part of their privileged position with 
respect to the inhabitants of non-Western, poorer countries. Second, within 
their own societies their economic position worsened in comparison to wealthy 
and high-income groups. Third, with the strong expansion of formal education 
and the overall upgrading of educational requirements they lost ground – in 
terms of numbers, economic position, and social status – in relation to the 
growing stratum of high-educated professionals. And fourth, their position 
weakened in relation to people who are not counted as belonging to the ethnic-
national majority, the overlapping (but not identical) categories of recent im-
migrants and their offspring, and ethnic and racial minorities. Whereas the first 
and the fourth developments are connected with tendencies of decreasing ine-
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quality on a global scale, the second and the third ones reflect shifts of increas-
ing inequality within national societies. 
The fourth development in particular is the feeding ground and primary mo-
tive of nationalist populism. Mass immigration from poorer to richer countries 
as part of wider processes of globalization contributed to the dissolution of 
class identities, the blurring of class lines and the growth of class inequalities 
within the richer countries. Whereas members of upper and upper-middle strata 
can easily distinguish themselves from the large majority of these immigrants, 
this is more difficult for the less privileged, whose class position is more simi-
lar to that of most immigrants. These minority groups became an easy target for 
grievances and antagonist sentiments, as they were defined as the others who 
threaten ‘our’ jobs and incomes, material security, physical safety, and ways of 
living. Antagonism is reinforced by resistance to ‘integration’ among groups of 
immigrants, who often remain strongly attached to their own ethnic group and 
country of origin, and sometimes embrace a militant version of Islam that de-
fines itself as fundamentally anti-Western. This is a form of counter-
stigmatisation that only contributes to negative stigmatisation on the part of the 
native population. 
This downward negative targeting of outsider groups is combined with the 
upward negative targeting of the (political and cultural) ‘elite,’ who are at-
tacked for their supposed readiness to allow the outsiders to come in, to protect 
them and give them special advantages. Populist leaders try to win votes by 
promising to do away with this elite and ‘give the country back to the people.’ 
Among their followers, distrust toward politics and politicians often goes hand 
in hand with high trust in the new leader, anti-elitism with admiration for the 
strong man. 
The recent rise of nationalist populism reflects not only a change, but also 
continuity in habitus formation; or, to put it differently, habitus change builds 
on previous habitus formation that is connected with long-term social devel-
opments. The ethnic or nativist nationalism that is at the core of present-day 
populism is a continuation of national we-feelings that spread in the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century in tandem with the intensification of inter-
dependencies on the national level (cf. Gellner 1983; Elias 2013 [1989], 156-
68; Wilterdink 1993). Immigration and growing ethnic diversity have kindled 
these feelings and given them a more nativist character, in which sharp symbol-
ic boundaries are drawn between the national we-group, defined in cultural, 
religious, ethnic and sometimes racial terms, and the non-native outsiders. This 
nationalism is now turned against ‘the elite,’ which is accused of abandoning 
the national values and neglecting the common national interests. 
Nationalist feelings are also strengthened by a perceived loss of national 
power and autonomy in relation to other nation-states. In Europe, the main 
culprit is the European Union, regarded by populist parties as an elitist project 
directed against the national interests. In the United States, the fear of losing 
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global dominance has provoked similar reactions. In both Europe and the United 
States, populism aims at the restoration of national power, glory, and autonomy 
by retreating from organized international cooperation – which may have the 
paradoxical effect that the nation’s power and international status actually 
weaken. 
There are, of course, important variations in the nature of populism and its 
social origins between countries and regions. The USA differs from Western 
European countries not only in its (still) hegemonic position in the world and 
the relatively strong impact of strict Christian religiosity within the country, but 
also in the long history of immigration, the strong cultural tradition of merito-
cratic individualism (‘the American dream’), and the legacy of racism and 
ethnic-racial dividedness – interconnected features that in turn may explain 
why the increase of socioeconomic inequality has been stronger there than in 
Western Europe (Wilterdink 2016), and why there is more upward identifica-
tion with the wealthy entrepreneurial and managerial class and a more wide-
spread popular aversion to government regulation and welfare state provisions. 
In several of these respects, however, Western European societies have become 
more similar to the USA in the past few decades. 
In spite of all the country-specific differences, nationalist populism in its 
various manifestations has common features and backgrounds. With the help of 
the theories of Elias and Bourdieu, we can understand its rise as manifestations 
of habitus changes that are rooted in transformations in power-interdependence 
relations and class structures on national and international levels. Present-day 
populism in Western societies, we may say, is a flawed revolt against rising 
socio-economic inequality and functional de-democratisation. Flawed, because 
it rests on illusions of national homogeneity and autonomy, because it is not 
primarily directed against the main driving forces and central actors of rising 
inequality, and because, if successful, it will not reverse tendencies of de-
democratisation but rather reinforce them – most directly by excluding minori-
ties. However, the current popularity of nationalist populism points to serious 
problems, for which no easy solutions are available. 
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